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b International Monetary Fund, USAAbstractThe pursuit of a new “macro-prudential” policy agenda has become a call to arms for many central banks and multilateral institutions seeking
to lean against financial factors that promote macroeconomic volatility. Cyclical use of prudential policy, such as variation in capital re-
quirements, is fraught with risks. It should only be employed during extreme circumstances. In general, policy makers should focus on
strengthening traditional monetary policy rules and micro-prudential policies.
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that the aggressive pursuit of macro-prudential policies e
policies that vary bank capital requirements, mortgage
leverage constraints, and other instruments on a cyclical basis
to cool down or heat up the financial system as needed e are
necessary to combat the cycles of financial boom and bust that
have characterized developed and developing economies over
the past three decades.
Skeptics, in contrast, believe that the pursuit of macro-
prudential policies could produce more distortions and more
macroeconomic volatility. Skeptics see excessive risk taking
as primarily a symptom of ineffective or unwise monetary
policies and micro-prudential policies, which if corrected,
would remove much of the incentive to undertake excessive
risks during booms. Excessive risk taking during booms, ac-
cording to this view, is primarily the result of the combination
of loose monetary policy, generous government safety nets for
banks, and borrowing subsidies for consumers (especially in
housing credit). Thus, the need for macro-prudential regula-
tion to lean against the wind during booms would be* Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions, Columbia Business
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time-tested rule, if micro-prudential regulation were reformed
to be made effective, and if government subsidies for risk
taking were absent. There is a substantial body of evidence in
support of that proposition. The focus on macro-prudential
regulation distracts from these more important policy reforms.
Furthermore, during recessions, relaxing prudential regu-
lation on macro-prudential grounds (to stimulate lending and
encourage investment) is likely to be destabilizing. The
tolerance of inadequate capital ratios of troubled lenders is
already an all-too-common discretionary reality known as
“forbearance,” which is usually accomplished through lax
recognition of loan losses. The severity of many severe
banking system disasters of the past three decades can be
traced to relaxing regulatory standards in the name of pre-
serving bank lending during contractions.
Problems of implementation also abound. The Basel III
standards envision a 2.5 percentage point cyclical variation in
minimum capital ratio requirements for banks. At the time that
policy was announced, there had been no microeconomic
studies of the effects of capital requirement changes on the
supply of credit. The aggressive cyclical variation in capital
requirements under Basel III seems to have been based on
unreliable back-of-the-envelope estimates that suggested small
loan-supply reactions to changes in capital requirements. More
recent studies, using microeconomic data on bank reactions to
capital requirement changes in the UK and provisioning
requirement changes in Spain, suggest very large reactions: inting by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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quirements (e.g., raising risk-based minimum capital ratios
one percentage point, from the sample average of 11 percent to
12 percent) reduces the supply of domestic lending to nonfi-
nancial firms by about 7 percent; in Spain, an increase in
provisioning requirements (a form of capital front-loading, not
a permanent increase in required capital, which should have a
much smaller effect on lending) reduces loan supply by about
3 percent. Banks’ reactions depend on a variety of circum-
stances (which reflect differences in the costs of raising equity
capital, and differences in the value of preserving lending re-
lationships), and these findings from the UK and Spain do not
provide a reliable indicator of the magnitude of that variation
for other banks operating in other countries. In short, macro-
prudential policy tools are a bazooka, not a pea shooter, and
using them as a cyclical tool, given the existing scant empir-
ical knowledge about their effects, amounts to firing a bazooka
without the benefit of a reliable sight.
Finally, an aggressive approach to macro-prudential policy
can be destabilizing through its unintended consequences for
other policy instruments, especially monetary policy. Pro-
cyclical monetary policy (policy that cuts interest rates and
expands money and credit during expansions) has been a
major contributor to risk taking during booms. Monetary
policy over the past century of U.S. history generally has been
pro-cyclical, either because of flawed conceptual frameworks
that have guided monetary targeting, or because of political
pressures associated with the financing of government deficits.
A major part of the cure for the destabilizing pro-cyclical
tendency of monetary policy is the establishment of a policy
rule to constrain and guide policy makers. An observable rule
that has a reliable track record for producing countercyclical
policy and price stability insulates central bankers from the
political pressure to use discretion to monetize deficits, and
protects the public from discretionary policies that are based
on faddish models.
Macro-prudential policy can undermine such a rule. First,
in the presence of a new and powerful set of tools that affect
the supply of credit in the financial system, it is quite likely
that the responses of inflation and unemployment to changes in
the federal funds rate will differ from what they were before,
which makes the existing empirical basis for a reliable mon-
etary rule obsolete. Second, adding numerous new tools and
objectives risks undermining the central bank’s accountability
for following its monetary policy rule. If a central bank em-
ploys multiple tools at its disposal for achieving countercy-
clical objectives (the federal funds rate, time-varying capital
ratio requirements, time-varying loan-to-value ratios on
mortgages, etc.) it may be very hard e perhaps virtually
impossible e for it to articulate any rule that will guide itsactions, especially given the lack of knowledge of the impacts
on the economy of these various policy levers.
These criticisms do not imply that macro-prudential
policy is always a bad idea. The financial histories of
many countries contain episodes in which extremely rapid
growth of bank credit is followed by a severe recession.
Monetary policy can be a weak tool to cool down excessive
bank credit growth in such extreme circumstances. The
recent experience of Colombia is an interesting example. In
2006e2007, rapid acceleration in credit growth, the current
account deficit, and inflation led the central bank to raise
interest rates dramatically, but this did not slow down credit
growth. Only the combination of a substantial increase in
capital requirements, provisioning requirements, cash re-
quirements, and capital controls was able to cool credit
growth, which led to a soft landing with no recession in
2008e2009. This is not an isolated example, but neither is it
a constant occurrence.
What, then, is the appropriate rule to follow with respect to
macro-prudential policy? Given the four problems mentioned
above, I suggest that policy makers continue to rely on
traditional monetary policy in almost all circumstances, and
not employ macro-prudential policies except during extreme
circumstances associated with the most severe credit booms.
For example, one could set a threshold of, say, 20% annualized
growth of banking system credit over a minimum length of
time (say, eighteen months). If credit growth exceeds that
threshold over that length of time, a pre-specified increase in
capital ratio requirements per quarter would be imposed (say,
50 basis points per quarter) until credit growth slowed to an
acceptable level; or else the regulator would have to explain
why the increase in capital requirements should not be
imposed. Once credit growth slowed, and following some pre-
announced formula, requirements would return to their normal
levels.
This approach would achieve much of what macro-
prudential policy advocates have in mind, while minimizing
potential costs. It would avoid making macro-prudential policy
a constant source of uncertainty. It would avoid undermining
micro-prudential policies during recessions through forbear-
ance. Because the macro-prudential policy tool would be used
so rarely, it would not undermine the effectiveness of the
monetary policy rule established by the central bank. This
approach, however, will only work to promote economic sta-
bility if it is combined with two other crucial long-term pol-
icies: a credible monetary policy rule, and an effective reform
of micro-prudential policies to avoid the subsidization of risk
taking. Much of the impetus for macro-prudential policy ac-
tion is the result of the failure to do either.
